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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 253 
Accident time: 10:45 Accident Date: 26/10/1998 
Where it occurred: Shekho village, Ahmad 
Khail District, Paktia 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: hard 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 18/02/2004 Date  last modified: 18/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 




An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available in 
October 1999. The following summarises its content. 
At the time of the accident the demining team were using a one-man drill in a two-man team. 
The victim had been a deminer for four years. It was 40 days since his last leave and two 
months since his last revision course. The accident occurred on a hard hillside with gravel 
and rocks. The mine was identified from fragments found at the site. 
The investigators determined that the victim was investigating a detector reading wearing his 
helmet and in a squatting position as he and his partner cleared an uphill breach. He was 
prodding with his bayonet when the mine detonated at 10:45. The investigators decided that 
"he was not wearing his helmet properly".  
He was blown back down the slope four metres and lost both eyes, had severe face injuries 
and his right hand was amputated at the forearm. 
The victim's visor was damaged and his bayonet "lost". 
The victim was treated at the site and taken to a local hospital where air evacuation was 
requested. When permission was refused, they drove the victim to another airport, arriving at 
16:45 where the victim was temporarily admitted to hospital waiting for a flight. At 18:00 they 
were told the flight could not happen until 10:00 the following day. The flight at 10:00 was 
never actually arranged [ staff reported that this was a bureaucratic failure] and the victim died 
at 15:45 on the following day while still waiting for it. [The bureaucratic failure was denied by 




The investigators concluded that the victim ignored safety procedures by prodding in a 
squatting position without wearing a helmet properly and prodded at too steep an angle. They 
added that the  Section Leader had displayed poor command and control. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the UN MAC investigate the poor evacuation procedure, 
that field supervisors ensure deminers adhere to technical guidelines, that the Section Leader 
be disciplined, and all demining groups arrange for the retirement of over-aged deminers [the 
victim's age was not given in the report]. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 327 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: more than 29 hours 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: Helmet 
 





Arm Below elbow 
FATAL 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was working with his visor raised and his error was not corrected by either his partner or the 
field supervisors. 
The loss of the victim's hand and lower arm indicates that he was prodding down onto the 
mine and illustrates the danger of using a short bayonet as an excavation tool. The secondary 
cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
The continued use of a short bayonet in Afghanistan ignores tooling advances made in other 
theatres. While some trials on university-designed equipment have been made in the region, 
none have been made using the tools found appropriate in other theatres (September 1999). 
This may be seen as a management failing.  
The medevac failing was reported to have been caused by the accident happening at a time 
when a planning meeting was taking place at the MAC (in Pakistan) so the individual(s) with 
the authority to authorise an air evacuation were not at their desks.  
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